In the matter of Mypreferred Transformation and Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., FAO (OS) (COMM) 67/2023 decided by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 03.04.2024.
Facts of the case–
The Appellant had filed objections against the award dated 04.02.2024 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 04.07.2022. The Single Judge dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the limitation period as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
Against the said order, the Appellant filed the appeal u/s Section 37(1)(c) of the Act. It is the case of the Appellant that the condonable period of 30 days expired when the Court was closed for vacations, therefore, the said period stood extended to the date on which the Court reopened after vacations. The appellants claim on the strength of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 that their petition was filed within a period that could be condoned by the Court, as it was filed immediately on reopening of the Court after summer vacations.
Question before the Court-
Whether the delay of thirty days can be condoned by the Court in terms of the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, would stand extended to the next date on which the Court reopens, if the last day of the period of thirty days falls on a date when the Court is closed.
Analysis and Reasoning–
The Respondent relied on the judgement of Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects & Marketing Limited; (2023) 8 SCC 453, wherein on similar facts, the Apex Court held that the period of thirty days which could be condoned by a Court on account of sufficient reasons is not the period of limitation and therefore, Section 4 of the Limitation Act was not attracted. Consequently, the said period of thirty days would not extend further even though the last day of such period fell on a date when the Court was closed.
However, the Appellants pointed out that the Apex Court in the said case did not consider the effect of Sec 10 of GC Act. The Appellant relied on Sridevi Datla v. Union of India & Ors. wherein the Apex Court was concerned with a case where Limitation Act was not applicable and gave recourse to the provisions Sec 10 of GC Act.
This Court observed that “It is at once clear that there is material difference in the language of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act and Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Undisputedly, Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applicable only where the prescribed period “for filing a suit, appeal or application expires on a date when the Court is closed”. The expression ‘prescribed period’ is defined to mean the period of limitation within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act. Clearly, if Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applicable, the period of thirty days delay which can be condoned in terms of the proviso to Section 34 of the A&C Act, would not be extended if it expired on a day when the Court is closed. This is because the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to the period of limitation and not the period of delay after the expiry of period of limitation.”
The Court further observed that “a plain reading of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act indicates that it also contemplates a case where the Central Act or Regulation allows an “act to be done or taken in any Court”. Therefore, the key question is whether the language of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act could be read expansively to also cover the act of filing a petition within the period of thirty days after the expiry of the period of limitation of three months.”
To answer the said question, the Court relied on Bhimashankara Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v. Walchandnagar Industries Limited (WIL), wherein the Apex Court in unambiguous terms held that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act was inapplicable so far as the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act is concerned. The Apex Court noted that proviso to Sec 10 of GC Act specifically excludes the application of the said Section to any act or proceeding to which the Limitation Act applies.
In view of the same, the Hon’ble Court accordingly dismissed the appeal.