If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself.

In the matter of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 5027/2024 decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 18.04.2024.

Facts of the case–

An advertisement calling for application for distributors to grant LPG distributorship was issued on 9/9/2012 wherein applications of the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 were found to be in order. In the draw of lots, the Appellant was found successful. Accordingly, LOI was issued to the Appellant on 24/2/2014 and on 30/6/2014, approval was granted by BPCL for starting LPG distributorship.

After a lapse of 4 years, the Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint with the BPCL that land offered by Appellant cannot be considered. The Corporation however on an application of the Appellant accepted the alternate land offered by him. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Corporation, the Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition in 2017, however, the same was dismissed for having no locus standi.

The Division Bench, however, allowed the appeal of Respondent No. 1 on the ground that the Appellant originally did not offer unencumbered land which was contrary to the guidelines and the subsequent amendment of the guidelines cannot be made applicable retrospectively by the Corporation in the case of the Appellant. The allotment made in favour of the Appellant was set aside.

The Appellant thereafter filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court challenging the DB’s order on ground of delay and laches and the Respondent No. 1 having no locus standi.

Analysis and Conclusion–

The Court observed that the Respondent No. 1 was a rival applicant along with the Appellant for grant of LPG distributorship, therefore, the Respondent No. 1 was aware of all the developments including that of the allotment of distributorship in favour of the Appellant way back in 2014. However, he did not raise any challenge till 2017, and thereby the Respondent No. 1 had allowed his right, if at all, if any to be drifted away or in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed.

The Court concluded that the writ petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. The Court noted that “An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts… In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.”

The Court further noted that “for filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited.

If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.”