In the matter of M/s BDR Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Narsingh Shah, CM(M) 412/2020 alongwith four other similar matter, decided by Delhi High Court on 03.08.2021.
Background of the case-
The Petitioner/Plaintiff claimed to be landlord of a number of premises which was leased by him through registered deeds to the Respondents/ Defendants at a monthly rate of Rs. 50,000/- in 2018. The civil suits for eviction were filed in 2019 claiming that the Respondents had defaulted in paying the monthly rent. The Petitioner further filed applications under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC seeking judgment of admissions, for which extensive arguments took place and the Trial Court fixed matter “for orders” on 04.08.2020, however, on 01.08.2020, the new counsel engaged by the Respondents sent an application requesting the court to adjourn the passing of the orders under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC, till the disposal of the application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC and citing the said reason, the Trial Court passed order dated 04.08.2020 thereby listing the case for arguments on O6R17 application. The Petitioner has challenged the said order on the ground that the case was fixed for 04.08.2020 for passing orders on the application under O12R6 and O15-A of CPC. However, the Respondents contended that an application seeking amendment can be filed at “any stage”, even where the case has been reserved for judgment. Mere reservation of the order on the application of O12R6 could not taken to mean that the application was to be allowed and the judgment was to follow and it cannot be presumed that the reservation of the matters “for orders” on the application could only mean “reservation of judgment”.
Analysis of the Court-
In order to determine whether the impugned order was a “judgment” or only an “interlocutory/intermediate order”, the Court observed that it is necessary to answer the question as to whether the application under O6R17 of CPC could have been filed after the Trial Court had heard arguments on the application under O12R6 of CPC.
Placing reliance on sec 2(9) and 2(14) which defines “judgment” and “order” respectively, the Court observed that “an “order” is something that does not result in a decree or, therefore, a final conclusion of a matter, though a “judgment” may include an “order”. The term “judgment” indicates a judicial decision given on the merits of the disputes brought before the Court. It determines the rights of the parties finally. In contrast, an “order” may not be so but could be an interlocutory one, if it does not determine or decide the rights of the parties once and for all. Thus, there are, broadly speaking, two kinds of “orders”, one, that is in the nature of a final order and the other not determining the main issue with any finality. If such orders have been passed to help with the progress of the case, they may dispose of a specific question finally, but without finally disposing of the dispute. There is yet another category of “orders”, which, if decided one way, would result in the determination of the rights of the parties finally, but, if determined in any other way, would result in the continuation of the proceedings. Such orders have been described as “intermediate” or “quasi final orders”.
Order XII relates to “admissions” and Rule 6 provides that the court may “at any stage” of the suit, either on the application of any party or on its own motion, without waiting for a determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit. Where a judgment is pronounced, a decree is to be drawn up. In other words, O12R6 of CPC does not per se provide for a final determination of the rights between the parties, though it may result in such a final determination. It is further noted that “the court exercises an absolute discretion when it deals with an application under O12R6 of CPC. The courts have repeatedly held that “judgments on admissions” should not be passed lightly and that even if there is an unequivocal admission by a party, judgment on admission may be declined, if the court is of the opinion that passing such a judgment would work injustice to the party making such an admission.”
Therefore, it is the considered view of the Court that given the nature of the powers vested in the court under O12R6 of CPC, at the stage when the case is reserved for orders, it is still at a stage that would be at best, intermediate. It could either lead to the conclusion of the suit on account of complete determination of rights of the parties or it could result in continuation of the suit, on account of rejection of the said application, therefore, the Court concluded that there was nothing to preclude the Trial Court from hearing the application under O6R17 of CPC, which was filed by the Respondents, even after the hearing on the application under O12R6 of CPC filed by the Petitioner was concluded.
The Court further held that since the purpose of O6R17 is to allow either party, at any stage, to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner as are necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions/controversies between the parties, subject to satisfying the court of due diligence, and in view of the fact that the power of the court under O12R6 of CPC is discretionary, and could result in the final disposal of the matter, permanently debarring the defendant from exercising his right to defend such a suit, the application under O6R17 of CPC should be considered on merits before the power under O12R6 of CPC is exercised by the Trial Courts.