Scope and ambit of Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the powers of the High Court relating thereto

In the matter of Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, Civil Appeal No. 9444 of 2016, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 07.04.2022

Facts of the Case-

The Appellant being the LR of the original owner (since deceased) filed an eviction petition u/s 14(1)(e) r/w Sec 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Respondent being the tenant filed application seeking leave to defend challenging (i) the title of the Appellant; (ii) the property actually belonging to the Govt. of India under the Enemy Property Act, 1968 and (iii) availability of alternative accommodations. The Ld. Rent Controller dismissed the said application holding that the title of the Appellant cannot be questioned by the Respondent, the averments regarding the suitability of alternative accommodation are vague and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act would not be made applicable to the properties in question.

The Respondent thereafter approached the Delhi High Court invoking the proviso to Sec 25B(8) of the Act. The High Court allowed the revision petition on the premise that the denials of the Appellant qua the plea of alternative accommodation are vague and thus the Respondent in his leave to defend application has raised triable issues. Against the said order, the Appellant has approached the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Analysis of the Court-

The Court noted that for obtaining an order of eviction u/s 14(1)(e), two grounds are needed to be satisfied, namely the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. The Court further observed that the object of Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of Section 19 which gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose.

On the scope and ambit of the proviso to Sec 25B(8), the Apex Court noted that “the proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5) (leave to defend application). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.”

Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision.

Placing reliance on the judgements of Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 and Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327, the Court reversed the order of the High Court holding that the very basis upon which the revision was allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the very provision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25B(8).